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he protagonist of Margaret Atwood’s 1981 novel Bodily 
Harm, Rennie Wilford, is a Canadian journalist who has come 
to the (fictional) Caribbean islands of St. Antoine and Ste. 
Agathe to write a travel piece and take a vacation as she recovers from 
a partial mastectomy. As Rennie becomes entangled in the islands’ vio-
lent political struggles, we soon see that this writing assignment will 
be a shocking return to the earnest focus on uncovering “abuses” (55) 
that began her career in 1970. Rennie has more recently found herself 
writing about “lifestyles” (127) for Visor, the magazine that has agreed 
to send her to these remote islands for what ostensibly should be a 
fluffy tourism piece. It was the managing editor of Visor who also, some 
months ago, assigned Rennie to “do a piece on pornography as an art 
form,” urging her to “Keep it light” (197). At the beginning of Part V of 
Atwood’s novel, Rennie remembers her meeting with Frank, a Toronto 
artist who makes “sculptures using life-sized mannequins”: women’s 
bodies made into tables and chairs, a woman “harnessed to a dogsled, 
with a muzzle on” entitled Nationalism is Dangerous, a man dressed in a 
business suit with plastic dildoes glued to his head called Erogenous Zone 
Clone Bone (198). Rennie recalls telling Frank that his work “doesn’t 
exactly turn me on”; Frank replies, not at all offended, “It’s not supposed 
to turn you on,” continuing: “Art is for contemplation. What art does 
is, it takes what society deals out and makes it visible, right? So you can 
see it” (198).
In fact, it is actually Atwood’s discomfort with art’s accurate or 
objective reflections of reality that drives her literary project in Bodily 
Harm. As Simone Drichel has argued, the novel is concerned with both 
the impossibility of divorcing representations of the “real” from the 
socially constructed, and the insufficiency of the documenting gaze to 
“make society visible”; by exploring these politics of visibility, Atwood 
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ultimately deconstructs “Sartrean-derived theories that allow the gaze 
to construct an all-encompassing reality” (33). Drichel suggests that 
Atwood not only deliberately highlights the limitations and violations 
of the gaze but also posits an alternative through a different kind of 
looking, what she calls, drawing upon Emmanuel Levinas, “the ethical 
regard for the other person” (23). Through its exploration of this kind 
of regard, expressed through the immediacy of touch, Drichel argues, 
Bodily Harm asks us to both “recognize the limits of representation and 
acknowledge the (potentially traumatic) real materiality of our existence 
. . . as the space of ethical resistance” (43). 
Drichel’s argument opens up fruitful new ways of thinking about 
Bodily Harm, showing that Atwood’s interrogation of the complicated 
relationship between sight, experience, language, and representation 
is what allows her to move past an “objective” uncovering of injustice 
towards a more nuanced, self-ref lexive commentary, one that might 
lead to substantive action or change. But while Drichel locates this 
commentary in a Levinasian model of ethical regard that highlights 
the importance of bodily connection, of a material relationality that 
enables and produces agency (35), it seems equally important to attend 
to what isn’t and perhaps can’t be regarded, bodily felt, or materially 
experienced in Atwood’s novel. Indeed, an essential part of Atwood’s 
literary and political project in Bodily Harm is her deliberate representa-
tion of absences: empty spaces, gaps in knowledge or comprehension, 
textual blankness or silences.
As much as Rennie’s trip forces her — and Atwood’s readers — to 
carve out a space for ethical resistance in a “real” experience beyond 
representation, Bodily Harm is a text that is also almost obsessively inter-
ested in what can’t be seen, expressed, or apprehended, what is not there 
when one tries to look, speak, feel, or understand. From the rope that 
Rennie finds on her bed before she leaves for St. Antoine — left in an 
empty apartment by a missing intruder, coiled around nothing — to 
her partially removed breast, to the gaps in plot and text that prolifer-
ate as the novel unfolds, Bodily Harm, I argue, uses absences to mark 
the limits of connection and articulation between individuals, across 
physical, emotional, and cultural spaces, and through texts. Perhaps 
paradoxically, moreover, both Rennie and we as readers come to learn 
that these absences in space, text, and meaning often “speak” or signify 
the most complex and troubling messages at the heart of the novel, 
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messages central to Atwood’s careful probing of the intersections of 
questions of gender, race, nation, and postcoloniality. For even as she 
constructs a moving tale of Rennie’s political and emotional awakening, 
Atwood disallows her readers access to a resolved narrative of empathy 
and connection. Even as she depicts the importance of looking past 
the “surface” to see the depth of human experience and oppression, 
Atwood constantly positions sight and observation as actions that are 
both profoundly limited in their ability to apprehend reality and always 
invested with disturbing dynamics of privilege and control — even 
during moments of bodily connection. And even as she sets up paral-
lels between, for instance, cancer in the body and social illness in the 
body politic, the violence of pornography and the violence of the state, 
the silencing of women and of colonial subjects, Atwood uses textual, 
bodily, and spatial absences to highlight the danger of equating these 
different kinds of harm. Using the logic of gaps to mark the limits of 
what can be “made visible” about suffering and injustice, of what is pos-
sible to relate (or relate to) about both individual struggles and systems 
of oppression, Atwood calls attention to the politics of representation 
and reflects upon her own subject position. Moreover, she calls upon 
her readers — in the specific context of North American feminism and 
more generally — to think critically about the stakes involved and the 
gaps that arise in creating totalizing political narratives across disparate 
spaces, subjectivities, and modes of struggle.
Atwood’s novel oscillates between Rennie’s time on two Caribbean 
islands — first St. Antoine, then Ste. Agathe — and her earlier life in 
Canada, from a sometimes traumatic childhood, to the violence of her 
sexual relationships, to brief but disturbing interactions with porno-
graphic materials, to the breast cancer and partial mastectomy from 
which she is recovering. These movements between Rennie’s experiences 
in the Caribbean and Canada speak to the two spaces’ complex link-
ages through histories of slavery and colonization, as well as processes of 
tourism, migration, and diaspora. The shifts also allow Atwood to map 
questions of power and control, oppression and subjugation, individual 
and collective identity onto both corporeal and (trans-)national spaces, 
weaving together these various thematic strands as part of a matrix of 
forms of “bodily harm.” As Diana Brydon points out, the novel’s “title 
itself embodies the conflation of body politic, female body, and colonized 
space/tropical island that generates the double narrative of Rennie’s can-
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cer and Ste. Agathe’s revolution” (“Atwood’s” 109), and the novel as a 
whole can be seen as an extended exploration of the analogousness of the 
subjugation of bodies, genders, races, and nations that the title implies.1 I 
propose, however, that close attention to Atwood’s construction of these 
correspondences reveals key gaps within which we can locate an ultim-
ate critique of easy comparisons between different kinds of suffering and 
forms of abuse. By assembling correspondences between different kinds 
of bodily harm while simultaneously highlighting the missing pieces 
in these constructions, Atwood productively complicates comparative 
frameworks of violence. In doing so, she critiques the problematic ways 
in which mainstream North American feminist discourses during what 
is known as the “second wave” deployed and relied upon these frame-
works, showing how they could both flatten out material differences and 
maintain the centrality of Western female subjectivities.
We learn in one of Rennie’s f lashbacks that her boyfriend Jake, “a 
packager” for a living — designing labels and deciding “how things 
would look and what context they would be placed in” — has also 
been packaging Rennie herself (95). This includes redecorating Rennie’s 
apartment: “In the livingroom he hung blowups of Cartier-Bresson 
photographs, three Mexican prostitutes looking out of wooden cubicles, 
their eyebrows plucked thin and drawn into exaggerated bows, their 
mouths clown-mouths, an old man sitting in a field of deserted chairs” 
(96). Then Jake moves onto the “night” spaces:
In the bedroom he hung a Heather Cooper poster, a brown-skinned 
woman wound up in a piece of material that held her arms to her 
sides but left her breasts and thighs and buttocks exposed. She had 
no expression on her face, she was just standing there, if anything 
a little bored. The picture was called Enigma. The other picture 
in the bedroom was a stylized print of a woman lying on a 1940’s 
puffy sofa, like the one in their own livingroom. She was feet-first, 
and her head, up at the other end of the sofa, was tiny, featureless, 
and rounded like a doorknob. In the foreground there was a bull. 
(96-97)
What is noteworthy about these passages is the entanglement of levels of 
subjection through the language of sight and visibility. Woven together 
are Jake’s paternalistic relationship to Rennie and his visually “pack-
aging” both her body and her home; his choice of artwork exemplifying 
the male gaze; the depiction of sex workers literally boxed in and placed 
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on exaggerated display; the sexualization and objectification of women 
of colour; the stylization of women’s bodies into non-threatening forms 
that lie down and are tied up, whose unique parts are reduced to domes-
tic images of “bows” and “doorknobs.” Here, bodily subjugation, sexual 
exploitation, racial exoticization, and economic disparity are linked in a 
common network of unequal, oppressive gazes.
Even more than the images hung in her home, Atwood’s narration 
of Rennie’s experience looking at pornography prompts readers to rec-
ognize the intersections of power and violence upheld through the act 
of looking. Immediately after Rennie meets Frank the artist and learns 
about “making it visible,” she views a collection of pornographic “raw 
material” confiscated by the Metro Police (199). Rennie watches the 
first few film clips “with detachment”; even the “sex-and-death pieces, 
women being strangled or bludgeoned or having their nipples cut off 
by men dressed up as Nazis,” seem too unrealistic to be disturbing: 
“Rennie felt it couldn’t possibly be real, it was all done with ketchup” 
(200). But then:
This is our grand finale, the policeman said. The picture showed 
a woman’s pelvis, just the pelvis and the tops of the thighs. The 
woman was black. The legs were slightly apart; the usual hair, the 
usual swollen pinkish purple showed between them; nothing was 
moving. Then something small and grey and wet appeared, poking 
out from between the legs. It was the head of a rat. (200)
Rennie cannot “make it out of the room” before vomiting (200-01). 
Like the description of the images on Rennie’s walls, this passage asks 
us to read the subjugation of women through the lens of race, and, 
even more graphically and viscerally, calls attention to the gaze as an 
actual penetration of the body that renders it anonymous, passive, and 
utterly consumed. That the video features a rat, moreover, is significant: 
the creature not only renders literal a sense of animal brutality, but 
also carries associations with mobility, invasion, and disease, therefore 
subtly evoking histories of slavery and colonization. In these ways, the 
video allows Atwood to highlight interlocking forms of exploitation, 
drawing a line from individual bodies to gendered and racial popula-
tions to international political struggles; the correlations of misogyny 
as devouring, racism as devouring, and imperialism as devouring can 
be apprehended neatly in a single visual representation.2
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But even as it seems to tempt us with this kind of synecdochic read-
ing — in which one video stands in for and signifies the whole of human 
exploitation — Atwood’s text also resists such oversimplified formula-
tions by purposefully constructing distinct absences in representation. 
Importantly, the description of the video is not immediately followed 
by Rennie’s vomiting on the policeman’s shoes; first, after the shocking 
statement, “It was the head of a rat,” the paragraph concludes: “Rennie 
felt that a large gap had appeared in what she’d been used to thinking 
of as reality. What if this is normal, she thought, and we just haven’t 
been told yet?” (200). While this moment could represent the “first 
split” in the grid of surfaces that Rennie has, professionally and person-
ally, come to learn not to look past, as Ildikó de Papp Carrington has 
argued (46-47),3 we might also understand it as a deliberate commen-
tary on the insufficiency of setting up facile correspondences between 
modes of violence and the gaps that arise when we do. From this angle, 
the “gap” that appears in Rennie’s constructed reality does not reveal 
something more true or comprehensive about the commonalities of 
forms of oppression, or expose some more authentic representation of 
human suffering, but rather opens up onto a space of inarticulation and 
incomprehension, a space past the limits of sight, understanding, and 
speech. The gap, then, is not only a marker for what cannot be seen and 
said about subjective experiences of exploitation, but also an illustration 
of the profound incommensurability of different kinds of exploitation, 
and the impossibility of fully apprehending those differences, let alone 
through a single image. Moreover, that this gap prompts Rennie’s inter-
nal thought, “What if this is normal . . . and we just haven’t been told 
yet?,” underscores her profoundly limited understanding of this image’s 
implications; she cannot help but center it around herself and her own 
personal and cultural context. Atwood here forces her readers to become 
aware of both what we cannot know and what we nevertheless assume 
to, of a tendency as viewers (and readers) to consider disparate experi-
ences only in relation to ourselves, and of what then gets left behind.
Turning back to the images on Rennie’s walls, we can see that they 
too are marked by absence. Just as the video shows only “a woman’s pel-
vis, just the pelvis and the tops of the thighs” — which not only enforces 
the objectification of her body but also disallows its viewers from know-
ledge of the woman’s individuality, emotional reactions, and agency — 
the prints leave out as much as they convey. The wooden walls obscure 
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from view the prostitutes’ bodies below their breasts. The chairs are 
empty. The (non-sexualized) parts of the body of the “brown-skinned 
woman” are covered by the material that binds her. Her expression is 
blank; the print’s title is Enigma. The head of the woman on the couch 
is featureless. Through the elements of blankness and emptiness in these 
images, Atwood comments upon what visual and textual representations 
cannot, or perhaps must not, assume to convey about the complexities of 
suffering, and the intersection — but not commensurability — of sys-
tems of oppression. For it is not that Atwood suggests that, for instance, 
racism, sexism, and imperialism are not intimately intertwined; rather, 
Atwood plays with the language and imagery of absence to call atten-
tion to the impossibility and the danger of constructing one-to-one 
correspondences between these enactments of power, of reading sexism 
as racism as imperialism. Moreover, by consistently inviting her readers 
to do exactly that, while also always preventing it through the logic of 
absence, Atwood self-reflexively interrogates a particular ideological and 
rhetorical history in North American feminist politics.
Martine Watson Brownley has argued that Bodily Harm is “the prod-
uct of a crucial cultural moment in the history of second-wave North 
American feminisms, and as such it bears the imprint of that moment” 
(68), “a transitional novel that queries the optimism of early feminist 
politics even while reflecting it in other ways” (5). As part of this analy-
sis, Brownley turns to “Atwood’s overly sweeping analogies,” which, 
she argues, “function thematically . . . simultaneously reflect[ing] and 
critiqu[ing] a particular kind of thinking that characterized elements 
of the early feminist movement and that remains prominent today 
in certain segments of it, notably among some feminist opponents of 
pornography” (73). In other words, from the title itself, to the images 
analyzed above, to the plot that takes Rennie into a postcolonial revolu-
tion, Atwood both exemplifies and criticizes what she sees as a Western 
feminist tendency to conflate or equate a variety of experiences and 
institutions — pornography, patriarchy, racism, imperialism, neocoloni-
alism, globalization — under the rhetoric of violence or “bodily harm,” 
in the name of gendered solidarity. “One of Atwood’s achievements,” 
Brownley writes, “is to convey the emotional power and suggestiveness 
of this rhetoric while also indicating its limitations” (73), for we see 
that the act of “[a]nalogizing these disparate forms of violence,” while 
often powerfully affecting readers and conveying the entanglement of 
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power structures, also “obscures as much as it reveals” (71). Expanding 
on Brownley’s arguments, I have been suggesting that this obscurity 
is not only the end result but also actually the method itself. Atwood 
destabilizes comparisons between different manifestations of “bodily 
harm,” and expresses her own self-consciousness about her limitations 
as a (white, female, Canadian, feminist) artist attempting to represent 
those intertwined manifestations, through focusing on the visual and 
textual absences that facilitate these analogies between forms of violence 
and upon which they are predicated. With this in mind, I want to turn 
now to the rope, a central image and linking metaphor in Atwood’s 
novel that highlights her exploration of the connections between bodily 
harms through the logic of absence. It also provides a point of entry into 
Rennie’s experiences in St. Antoine and Ste. Agathe, where the novel’s 
feminist and postcolonial critiques ultimately come to fruition even as 
they become more complicated.
Bodily Harm opens with Rennie’s narration of returning home soon 
after her partial mastectomy to find two policemen sitting at her kitchen 
table, called by one of her neighbours. “She heard footsteps up here,” 
the older policemen says, “and she knew it wasn’t you, she saw you go 
out, and she didn’t hear anyone go up the stairs. He jimmied open your 
kitchen window” (5). In this bland explanatory statement, the police-
man introduces an absent player onto the scene, the “he” who broke 
into Rennie’s apartment and “went back out through the window” (5). 
Though this “he” has departed, seeming not to have taken anything 
from Rennie, the intruder has left traces of his presence, as the other 
policeman points out: “He made himself a cup of Ovaltine. He was 
just waiting for you, I guess” (5). When Rennie wonders why, the older 
policeman answers, “Take a look,” seeming “pleased with himself, in 
charge. He had a present he’d been saving up” (5). He leads her into 
her bedroom and points out “a length of rope coiled neatly on the quilt. 
It wasn’t any special kind of rope, there was nothing lurid about it. It 
was off-white and medium thick. It could have been a clothesline” (5). 
The viewing of the rope swiftly changes the power dynamics in the 
room: no longer sitting at a kitchen table, the policemen are standing 
with Rennie in her most private space, the older one “smil[ing] down 
at [her], watching [her] face, almost delighted, like an adult who’s just 
said I told you so to some rash child with a skinned knee” (6). Rennie, 
they unsubtly begin to imply, might have been asking for it. They ask 
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about the pictures on the wall — the prostitutes, the bound and door-
knob-headed women — and, when Rennie explains, “They belong to 
a friend of mine,” one replies, “Quite a friend” (6). The questions con-
tinue: “You close the curtains when you take a shower?”; “You close the 
curtains when you get dressed at night?”; “You have men over here a 
lot? Different men?” (6). Although Rennie answers firmly, “I close the 
curtains. . . . I don’t have men over. I turn out the lights. I get undressed 
by myself, in the dark,” the older one is still “smirk[ing]” at her, and so, 
“suddenly . . . angry,” Rennie “unbutton[s] [her] blouse and pull[s] [her] 
left arm out of the sleeve and drop[s] the slip strap over [her] shoulder” 
(7). Showing the policemen her partially removed breast, she tells them, 
“I want you to believe me,” a plea that ends the scene (7).
In opening Bodily Harm with the image of the coiled rope, Atwood 
constructs an initial metaphor — immediately overdetermined despite, 
or perhaps because of, its open-endedness and banality — through 
which to understand and draw correlations between the threat of 
death and violence in all of its various manifestations. These connec-
tions are clear: home invasion and cancer, the absent-yet-present male 
stranger and the invisible-yet-ubiquitous male gaze, rope and rape.4 
Consequently, left on the bed where Jake played out his domination 
fantasies, in the room whose walls are hung with images of female sub-
jection, the rope too points readers to a feminist stance “which asserted 
strong links between pornography as misogynist power fantasy and 
male violence against women” (Howells 121) — and, more broadly, 
represents another analogization of different forms of bodily harm. 
Following this logic, the anonymity of the man who left the rope then 
allows for him to become a figure for the many men in Rennie’s life,5 or 
for all men, or for the larger network of patriarchal social relations that 
gives rise to individual acts of violation.6 But these readings are always 
already undercut by the fact that they are made possible by and ultim-
ately depend upon the logic and language of absence: the rope is coiled 
around nothing at all, left by an intruder who has already departed, 
in an empty apartment; soon, it is gone altogether, taken away as “evi-
dence,” though “Every time [Rennie] went into her bedroom she could 
see it, coiled on the bed, even though it was no longer there” (32). The 
rope works as a metaphor for all kinds of bodily harm — pornographic, 
sexual, medical, patriarchal — precisely because there are crucial gaps 
in space and in meaning; by calling attention to this, Atwood both 
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comments upon the limits of representation, of “making visible” some 
essential aspect of social relations, and warns her readers against draw-
ing simplistic correlations between women’s (or people’s) experiences. 
Moreover, it is only through showing the policemen what is “missing” 
from her breast, another form of absence as “evidence,” that Rennie is 
able to mount a defense against their accusations. This suggests at once 
the impossibility of fully articulating individual suffering, the power 
of absence as a marker of what cannot be “made visible,” and the prob-
lems of understanding disparate kinds of violence as part of a singular 
framework of oppression.
In its role as a marker for both violence and absence, the rope figures 
crucially in Bodily Harm: the novel actually begins with Rennie narrat-
ing, “This” — this initial incident, this coiled rope on her bed — “is 
how I got here” (3). The “here,” we finally learn at the beginning of Part 
VI, is a cell in the St. Antoine prison that Rennie is sharing with Lora, 
a Canadian woman living on Ste. Agathe whom Rennie has met in her 
explorations of the islands. It is Rennie’s experience with the anonymous 
intruder and the rope he leaves behind that prompts her, haunted by 
the sense that she is being “watched” like a “moving target in someone 
else’s binoculars” (31), to travel to St. Antoine, where she can become a 
tourist, “invisible” and “safe” (30). Rennie soon learns, however, that she 
is being watched on the islands as well; on St. Antoine and Ste. Agathe 
as in Rennie’s Toronto, all are implicated in a complex web of racial, 
gendered, political, and imperial power dynamics that play out through 
what Drichel calls “a violent economy of representational gazes” (38). 
The stakes here, though, are different: unlike Canada, a postcolonial 
state that now occupies the uneasy role of paternalistic Western benefac-
tor, the islands are gearing up for the first elections “since the British 
pulled out” (69). As Rennie learns from Paul, an American Vietnam vet-
eran living on Ste. Agathe with ties to an international drug- and gun-
running ring, “Yes, there will be trouble” during this political upheaval, 
although he’s quick to tell Rennie that she won’t get hurt: “You’re a tour-
ist, you’re exempt” (69). But through commencing a relationship with 
Paul, talking with Dr. Minnow, one of the men hoping to defeat the 
current prime minister, and spending time with Lora, who is romantic-
ally involved with another political contender, Rennie learns that she is 
not at all exempt. She is ultimately arrested on “suspicion” (251) after a 
violent political coup that leaves Dr. Minnow dead, and is then locked 
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in prison with Lora, where she witnesses the brutal beatings of other 
prisoners, including her cellmate.
As readers, we might understand Rennie’s trip as a narrative and 
thematic “uncoiling” of the rope and an exploration of where it leads,7 
a response, perhaps, to the questions Rennie asks herself early in the 
novel: “And when you pulled on the rope, which after all reached into 
the darkness, what would come up? What was at the end, the end?” (32). 
In that passage, Rennie preliminarily answers her own rhetorical ques-
tions: “A hand, then an arm, a shoulder, and finally a face. At the end 
of the rope there was someone. Everyone had a face, there was no such 
thing as a faceless stranger” (32). Indeed, as Rennie finds that the rope 
leads straight to other manifestations of bodily harm, this time in the 
form of neocolonialism, international relations, revolutionary violence, 
and ultimately Lora’s beaten body, it seems that Rennie is finally able to 
face the realities of oppression, to fill in the gaps that have prevented her 
comprehension of personal and common suffering. But while Rennie 
is certainly changed by the end of the novel, it is actually a continuing 
logic of gaps that leads her, and us as readers, to the climactic prison 
scenes and the novel’s conclusion.
Rennie’s trip itself is figured as an absence, one that is very much a 
privilege: as she prepares to go to the Caribbean, Rennie reflects that 
she is “lucky that she can manage these sidesteps, these small absences 
from real life; most people can’t” (8). Against Rennie’s blithe acknow-
ledgement of the “luck” that gives her the freedom to absent herself 
from her “real” life, though, Atwood’s project in Bodily Harm as a whole 
is, as Brydon points out, instead to remind “us of the human costs, 
betrayals, and material suffering on which these apparent freedoms are 
built,” thereby “exposing the inevitable investment of contemporary 
tourist travel in imperialist and capitalist domination” (“Atwood’s” 94). 
And one of Atwood’s key techniques for reminding us of these connec-
tions between tourism, imperialism, capitalism, and human exploitation 
is her textual exploration of absence: absence as lack of comprehen-
sion, as silence, as empty space. For absence in the world of Atwood’s 
novel signifies not a vacation from serious responsibilities but perhaps 
the exact opposite: a recognition of at once what is impossible to see, 
express, or compare about human suffering, what gets lost in femin-
ist and humanitarian efforts to name and address that suffering, and 
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what, paradoxically, nevertheless must somehow be accounted for as a 
concerned global citizen.
Absence pervades Rennie’s time in St. Antoine and Ste. Agathe. It is 
there, for instance, in the “thousand tins of ham” that, as Dr. Minnow 
tells Rennie, Canada donated to St. Antoine after a hurricane, but which 
never made it to the starving people: “‘The refugees never see this ham,’ 
he says, explaining patiently. . . . ‘The ham turn up, surprise, at the 
Independence Day banquet. To celebrate our freedom from Britain. 
For the leading citizens only. Many of us were very amused, my friend. 
There was a round of applause for the sweet Canadians’” (20). Absence 
is there when Paul tells Rennie about what is at stake with the islands’ 
elections, “watching not her but the space in front of them” (69). It 
permeates Rennie’s visit with Dr. Minnow to “Fort Industry,” built by 
the British and housing a tent camp for hurricane refugees (as well as 
the jail where she will eventually be imprisoned): children surround 
her and ask her to take their pictures, but “this doesn’t seem to satisfy 
them. Now they want to see the picture” (118). When Rennie tells Dr. 
Minnow, “This isn’t a Polaroid,” and says to the children, “It doesn’t 
come out,” we learn both that the picture is invisible and inaccessible — 
available only to Rennie when she develops the film — and that some-
thing cannot be communicated in the unequal power dynamics of her 
tourist interaction with the impoverished children: “It’s hard to make 
them understand” (118). Absence is the gap between when Dr. Minnow 
shows Rennie “an odd structure, made of boards nailed not too carefully 
together . . . [with] steps up to a platform, four supports but no walls, a 
couple of crossbeams” — Rennie initially “thinks it’s a child’s playhouse 
which has been left unfinished” — and when she finally “understands 
what she’s being shown. It’s a gallows” (123). It is that empty space of 
imperial violence that Dr. Minnow then tells Rennie, unsmiling, that 
she must photograph “for your article. . . . For the sweet Canadians” 
(123). It is Paul’s recurring dream about “just a hole in the ground, with 
the earth that’s been dug out. It’s quite large, there are trees around it. 
I’m walking towards it. There’s a pile of shoes off to the side”; when 
Rennie asks, “Then what?,” Paul replies, “Then I wake up” (238), leav-
ing readers to wonder whose shoes are piled up, what is in the hole, and 
why that narrative can never be completed. And it is embodied, perhaps 
most poignantly, in the deaf and mute old man in St. Antoine whom 
Rennie encounters periodically throughout the novel, first attempting 
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to silently shake her hand, then being beaten in the street by a group 
of policemen, seeing Rennie and moaning in a “stif led reaching out 
for speech which is worse than plain silence” (138), and finally in the 
prison, looking at her with “a voice but no words” (279).
This last example, in which Rennie looks out of her cell window 
onto a courtyard where the old man and other prisoners are being tor-
tured, seems to mark a climactic shift in awareness for Rennie, leading 
her, perhaps, away from absences and gaps in understanding towards 
a fuller view of the ubiquity of violence, the relationship between sys-
tems of oppression, and, most crucially, her own physical and ethical 
implication in these dynamics. But within this passage and by the end 
of the novel as a whole, Atwood ultimately disallows both Rennie or 
her readers access to a full resolution that makes visible the relationships 
between the various threads of “bodily harm” that have been woven 
through the text. Instead, there are always gaps and disconnections. In 
insisting upon these absences, I do not mean to suggest that we cannot 
find an important message at the heart of Atwood’s novel. Rather, I 
locate that message in Atwood’s ultimate refusal to neatly seal off the 
gaps in visibility, meaning, and connection that she has set up, and 
argue that these gaps reveal her political and artistic message to be more 
nuanced and self-reflexive than we might initially think.
With Lora hoisting her up to the window, Rennie peers out into the 
courtyard and sees “five or six men in uniform” and “another group,” 
tied together by the arms with rope and being pushed down to their 
knees (278). “The ones kneeling,” Rennie notices, “have long hair, long 
black hair standing out from their heads,” and “at first [she] thinks 
they’re women, then she sees they are naked from the waist up, they 
have no breasts” (278). The policemen begin sawing the prisoners’ hair 
off using their bayonets with “chilling . . . tidyness” (278), but the pre-
cise ceremony is disrupted when a policeman is “not careful enough” 
and slices one of the prisoner’s heads with his bayonet. As the man 
begins to “howl,” the policemen turn on him with buckets of water, 
kicks, and cattle prods, and Rennie finally recognizes him when he 
looks back at her, blood pouring down his face: “the deaf and dumb 
man . . . he can see her, she’s been exposed, it’s panic, he wants her to 
do something” (279). Asking Lora to let her down from the window, 
Rennie “leans against the wall” and thinks:
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It’s indecent, it’s not done with ketchup, nothing is inconceivable 
here, no rats in the vagina but only because they haven’t thought 
of it yet, they’re still amateurs. She’s afraid of men and it’s simple, 
it’s rational, she’s afraid of men because men are frightening. She’s 
seen the man with the rope, now she knows what he looks like. 
She has been turned inside out, there’s no longer a here and a there. 
Rennie understands for the first time that this is not necessarily a 
place she will get out of, ever. She is not exempt. Nobody is exempt 
from anything. (279-80)
Here, Atwood explicitly connects the pornographic abuse Rennie saw 
in Toronto with the state abuse she witnesses against political prison-
ers, the man with the rope in her apartment to the men with ropes in 
the prison, the subjection of women under patriarchy to the subjection 
of colonized peoples under military and imperial law, the “here” of 
St. Antoine with the “there” of Canada. Rennie, this passage suggests, 
has come to understand something crucial about the relational nature 
of various manifestations of violence and, more importantly, has rec-
ognized that she is not, has never been, merely an innocent observer. 
In realizing that she “is not exempt,” that she too has been “seen” and 
“exposed,” Rennie sees not only that she is in very real danger — that 
she won’t necessarily be saved — but also that her position as a white, 
privileged Western tourist implicates her in what is happening, that she 
too is an active participant in the playing out of gendered, racial, and 
imperial oppressions. 
By acknowledging this, Atwood seems to suggest, Rennie is finally 
forced to come to terms with her own responsibility to others, to really 
see and be seen by other people — not gazing, not watching or staring, 
not passively witnessing, but seeing — and to ethically respond to them. 
Indeed, when in the next scene Lora is brutally beaten by two guards, 
Rennie cannot help but see and, moreover, she reluctantly recognizes 
that she must take ownership of that seeing: “She doesn’t want to see, 
she has to see, why isn’t someone covering her eyes?” (282). When the 
guards have left, Rennie takes hold of Lora’s hand and “sits with her, 
pulling Lora’s head and shoulders onto her lap” (287). At first “Rennie 
wants to throw up, it’s no one she recognizes, she has no connection 
with this, there’s nothing she can do, it’s the face of a stranger, someone 
without a name”; but as she already knows, of course, “it’s the face of 
Lora after all, there’s no such thing as a faceless stranger, every face is 
someone’s, it has a name” (288). And so Rennie holds Lora’s hand, not 
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moving yet somehow “pulling . . . as hard as she can,” for “there’s an 
invisible hole in the air, Lora is on the other side of it and she has to 
pull her through”:
She holds the hand, perfectly still, with all her strength. Surely, if 
she can only try hard enough, something will move and live again, 
something will get born.
 “Lora,” she says. The name descends and enters the body, there’s 
something, a movement; isn’t there?
 “Oh God,” says Lora.
 Or was that real? She’s afraid to put her head down, to the heart, 
she’s afraid she will not be able to hear. (288)
In these moments of seeing and corporeally connecting with an 
insistently present “someone” whose individual “face” is a feature at once 
totally unique and universally shared — for “every face is someone’s” 
— we might read Atwood’s concluding message as an illustration of a 
way past the logic of absence towards a more substantive picture of the 
inextricable relationships between different manifestations of violence. 
Rennie, as Amelia Defalco suggests, seems now to be “inadvertently” 
awakened to “the consequences of relationality and responsibility” to 
other people’s bodies and freedoms (241).8 This ethical responsibility, 
moreover, includes an obligation not only to care for others, but also to 
tell their stories and convey their struggles, as Lora implores Rennie at 
one point during their time in prison: “Tell someone I’m here. . . . Tell 
someone what happened” (272). And indeed, on the plane trip back that 
is the novel’s final scene, Rennie decides to be “a subversive. She was 
not one once but now she is. A reporter. She will pick her time; then she 
will report” (290). The act of reporting — of representing people and 
their experiences through narrative, in all of the various meanings of 
the word — is crucial because it has the power to illuminate the shared 
dynamics and mutual implications of various structures of oppression, 
various forms of “bodily harm.” Indeed, this could actually be what 
makes Atwood’s novelistic telling of Rennie’s story meaningful: Rennie’s 
narrative is that of “all women, all victims and oppressors, all human 
beings, all. A here and a there, a past which is separate from a present 
or a future, no longer exists. The cell of malignancy is, finally, both in 
and of her and us” (Wilson).9
But to accomplish this kind of aff irmative reading, in which 
Atwood’s representation of a particular set of characters in particular 
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situations becomes a universally applicable story of the “malignancy” of 
bodily harm and its resolution through ethical action, we must necessar-
ily gloss over aspects of the conclusion that prove much more ambigu-
ous. Indeed, Rennie’s climactic experiences and the lessons she draws 
from them are fraught with uncertainty and misapprehension, continu-
ously highlighting the profound disconnections between understanding, 
sight, and representation that remain as the novel closes. For instance, 
Rennie’s stunning revelation that “She’s afraid of men,” that “She’s seen 
the man with the rope, now she knows what he looks like,” while not 
lacking in rhetorical and emotional power, somewhat misses the point: 
as Brownley notes, “men can indeed be frightening. But not all men 
have access to power, and not all men misuse it. Rennie’s moment of rec-
ognition, after all, occurs as she sees male prisoners being tortured” (77) 
— male prisoners, moreover, that she has initially mistaken for female, 
further undercutting the reliability of her perceptions. Rennie’s bodily 
connection with Lora is likewise forged through a set of moments char-
acterized by doubt and limited perception: trying to pull Lora through 
“an invisible hole in the air,” Rennie thinks she sees bodily movement 
but wonders, “isn’t there?”; she thinks she hears the sound of Lora’s voice 
but worries, “Or was that real?” We, as readers, will never know: the 
last scene with Lora ends with Rennie’s fear of listening for a heartbeat, 
her fear that “she will not be able to hear.” And Rennie’s conviction in 
her ultimate duty to report is undercut by the fact that, “For the first 
time in her life, she cannot think of a title” (290), cannot find adequate 
language for representing the strands of power and struggle she has seen 
and experienced. 
Finally, even as we learn that Rennie is at last “paying attention” and 
that she is, again, “not exempt,” the novel closes with the lines, “she is 
lucky, suddenly, finally, she’s overflowing with luck, it’s this luck hold-
ing her up” (291). This passage returns Rennie’s character back to the 
naïve sentiment of luck that began her trip and therefore seems to erase 
the lessons she has learned about different modes of power and respon-
sibility. And so it becomes clear that contrary to Rennie’s revelation 
that “there’s no longer a here and a there,” that spaces and times collapse 
through the universality of experiences, there is still a gap between 
“here” and “there,” between disparate struggles and different kinds of 
oppression. This gap is finally and permanently revealed through the 
spatial imagery of Rennie rising up above the islands to return home: in 
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the ever-widening empty space created as the plane departs, returning 
Rennie to her home in Canada, we cannot help but sense the incom-
mensurability of the many kinds of harm Atwood has illuminated. 
Moreover, that it is Rennie, like Atwood, who will “report” on these 
dynamics — because she, like Atwood, is a white woman from North 
America — reminds us again that acts of artistic and political represen-
tation are not only always partial and subjective, but also fraught with 
questions of power and privilege.
It is in the ambiguities opened up through these absences and 
obscurities — ambiguities sustained through the final pages of Bodily 
Harm — that Atwood locates her feminist, postcolonial, and literary 
critiques. With them, she conveys the limits of feminist narratives of col-
lectivity, the exploitation of the white tourist gaze, and the hidden hier-
archies and suppressions built into Western discourses, political move-
ments, and artistic representations. Atwood’s intentional construction 
and insistent illumination of gaps undergirds her careful questioning of 
easy comparisons of different struggles, of visibility as a political aim, 
of the limitations of language and representation, of the delicate and 
entangled relationship between literature, politics, and the production 
of identity. In this endeavour, Atwood raises similar concerns, though 
in a very different context, to those voiced in Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” delivered as a talk in 1983, just 
two years after the publication of Bodily Harm. In that piece, which 
proved so groundbreaking for both feminist and postcolonial politics, 
Spivak asks what it means to attempt to uncover the disparate experi-
ences of silenced populations; to recognize the complex matrices of race, 
class, and imperialism in terms of specifically gendered power dynamics; 
and, perhaps most of all, to be what she herself is: a writer and scholar 
seeking to address systems of power and oppression. Like Spivak’s cri-
tique, Atwood’s novel is both highly self-aware and keenly attentive to 
absences in texts, representations, and histories. Because of this, it too 
opens up new ways of thinking about a feminist politics that questions 
and decenters dominant discourses, that attends to the limits of com-
mensurability, that recognizes its reliance on a set of ever-evolving yet 
always incomplete epistemologies that, like an ethnography, “inherently 
imperfect,” will always “produc[e] gaps as it fills them” (Clifford 8).
To close, I turn, somewhat paradoxically, to the passage that opens 
Atwood’s novel, from John Berger’s Ways of Seeing. As an epigraph it 
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appears as “A man’s presence suggests what he is capable of doing to you 
or for you. By contrast, a woman’s presence . . . defines what can and 
cannot be done to her” (original ellipses). But Atwood has, unsurpris-
ingly, left us with crucial gaps in her (re)presentation of this quotation; 
there are those pesky ellipses, of course, and as it turns out, two senten-
ces have also been ignored without any indication at all. Berger’s full 
passage actually reads:
A man’s presence suggests what he is capable of doing to you or for 
you. His presence may be fabricated, in the sense that he pretends 
to be capable of what he is not. But the pretence is always toward 
a power which he exercises on others. By contrast, a woman’s pres-
ence expresses her own attitude to herself, and defines what can and 
cannot be done to her. (46-47)
Atwood’s quotation of Berger simplifies his nuanced observations by 
omitting the possibility of a man’s presence that is “fabricated” and based 
on “pretending,” and of a woman’s presence expressing something “to 
herself” and not only in relation to men. The quotation is therefore delib-
erately incomplete, with absences in text and in meaning. But perhaps 
this is exactly the point. Perhaps, in beginning her novel with a quotation 
that so seemingly simplistically lays out the unequal power dynamics of 
men and women, and then fundamentally complicating the idea that it 
is possible or even fruitful to talk about all “men” and “women” at all, 
Atwood in her epigraph is providing an initial set of directives to her 
readers: look for what isn’t said, what isn’t seen, what isn’t there at all. Pay 
attention to obscurities. Beware of simple understandings of privilege and 
exploitation. Question straightforward representations of the complexities 
of identity and experience; think critically about who gets to represent 
whom, how, and for what purpose; consider acts of representation in 
terms of the overlapping and yet distinct power dynamics of gender, race, 
and imperialism. Investigate the relationship between art and “real life,” 
between discourse and materiality, and consider that these distinctions 
might be blurry at best. And perhaps most of all, acknowledge your own 
implication in these tensions. In all of Atwood’s writing, we as readers 
continue to be reminded of the ellipses — in text, in sight, in representa-
tion, in comprehension — that mark our reliance on what seem to be 
easy answers, the limitations of attending only to “presences,” and most 
of all, our readerly and political responsibility to attend to what is left out.
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Notes
1 See, for instance, Brydon, “Atwood’s”; Goodwin; Kirtz; Melley; Patton; and 
Somacarrera.
2 See Patton 168.
3 See also Drichel 33.
4 See Howells; Lucking; and Rubenstein.
5 That one of the draft titles for Bodily Harm was Rope Quartet — a quartet that might 
include Jake, Daniel, Paul, and the intruder — has been noted in this context (Howells 115).
6 See Bouson 114; Brydon, “Caribbean” 185; Epstein 88; and Melley 71.
7 See Lucking par. 21 and Navarro 265.
8 See also, for instance, Drichel 36, 38; Carrington; Wilson par. 16, 17, 18.
9 See also Epstein 85 and Hansen 10.
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